The Missing Profits of Nations

Thomas Tørsløv (Danish Ministry of Finance) Ludvig Wier (UC Berkeley) Gabriel Zucman (UC Berkeley)

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Introduction

How much profits move across countries because of differences in corporate tax rates?

If there was a perfect international tax coordination:

- ▶ Which countries would gain/lose profits?
- ▶ How? Relocation of capital, or reduced profit shifting?

New data: foreign affiliates statistics \rightarrow wages, profits, etc., of foreign firms

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Structural business statistics (sbs) (New activity classification (NACE Rev 2))
  SBS - main indicators (sbs_na)
          SBS - industry and construction (sbs_ind_co)
          SBS - trade (sbs dt)
  BS - services (serv)
  B SBS - regional data - all activities (sbs_r)
  Access to finance (acf)
  Business demography statistics - all activities (bd)
  Factors of Business Success statistics - all activities (fobs)
  Foreign controlled EU enterprises - inward FATS (fats)
     Foreign control of enterprises - from 2008 onwards (NACE Rev.2) (fats 08)
          Foreign control of enterprises by economic activity and a selection of controlling countries (from 2008 onwards) (fats, g1a, 08)
              Foreign control of enterprises by controlling countries (from 2008 onwards) (fats_g1b_08)
           Foreign control of enterprises: research and development characteristics by economic activity (NACE Rev.2, B-F) and a selection of controlling countries (from 2009 onwards) (fats_g1a_rd)
     Foreign control of enterprises - 2003-2007 (NACE Rev. 1.1) (fats 03)
     Foreign control of enterprises - 1996-2002 (NACE Rev. 1.1) (fats 96)
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—> Use these new data to provide first global map of where multinationals book their profits

How we estimate the amount of profits shifted to tax havens


We compute **capital shares** α **in foreign vs. local firms** across the world. Striking global pattern:

- \triangleright Foreign firms have lower α than local firms...
- hd ... Except in tax havens: hugely higher lpha


Benchmark estimate: set profitability of foreign firms in havens equal to profitability of local firms in havens

- ▶ Transparent
- ▶ Robust

In tax havens, foreign firms are much more profitable than local firms



New data: bilateral service trade




—> Use these new data to allocate shifted profits to the countries where they have been made

How we allocate the shifted profits

Benchmark: follow destination of tax havens' service exports and intra-group interest receipts

- \triangleright Services: focus on royalties, management fees, ICT, fin. services \rightarrow most conducive of shifting
- ▷ Outcome: granular estimates of profit shifting (eg, France–Ireland, Germany–Switzerland, etc.)
- → **New global database** to study (some of) the redistributive effects of globalization (2015)
 - \triangleright Will update annually \rightarrow make it possible to study dynamics (eg, effect of policies)

MissingProfits.world



MissingProfits.world: the case of Spain


	Profits lost (\$, Millions)	Tax revenue lost (\$, Millions)	Tax revenue lost (% of corp. tax revenue)
All havens	14,880	3,720	
EU havens	11,919	2,980	
Belgium	1,063		
Cyprus			
Ireland	2,575	644	
Luxembourg	3,458	865	
Malta			
Netherlands	4,645	1,161	
Non-EU tax havens:	2,960		
Switzerland	2,078	519	2%
Bermuda, Caribbean, Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, Singapore and others			

Main results

40% of multinat'l profits (\approx \$600bn) shifted to havens

- ▶ Main losers: non-haven EU countries
- ▶ Profit shifting swamps tax-driven tangible capital mobility (different welfare implications)
- \triangleright Rise of capital share in higher than in official data \rightarrow provide corrected estimates of α , GDP, trade

The case of Ireland



Why should we care?

Whatever one's view about efficiency costs of capital taxation, global profit shifting raises policy issues:

- ▷ Distorted competition
- ▶ Inequality